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1 Introduction
The global financial and economic crisis has uncovered four major weaknesses in
the direction and control of many large, publicly traded companies, especially in the
financial services sector.
Firstly: With only a few exceptions, among them South Africa, most countries
have, contrary to the OECD principles, adopted the Anglo-Saxon corporate
governance guidelines, targeting the maximization of shareholder value.
Secondly: In contrast, successful companies in the financial services sector such
as family companies, partnerships and glocal companies, have only been affected
to a limited extent by the financial crisis. Those companies most affected by the
crisis did not dispose of holistic, measurable success criteria that added
simultaneous value to customers, owners, employees and the society.
Thirdly: As a consequence, the vast majority of variable compensation packages
were set for a short-term period, mainly yearly and using one often irrelevant
financial ratio as opposed to non-financial ratios and competitive benchmarks.
Furthermore, the integration of board, CEO and personnel compensation concepts
has been largely neglected.
Fourthly: Accordingly, holistic monitoring and risk management concepts have
been largely disregarded on the board level of many large organizations.
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Four broad recommendations, each including two lessons for an improved
corporate governance of large international publicly traded companies can be
deducted from these four weaknesses.
2 Keep it situational
Corporate Governance has to be adapted periodically to the changing conditions on
an international, national, and corporate level.
2.1 First lesson
On a national level, it is necessary for corporate governance guidelines to be
challenged. Several corporate scandals have provoked a precipitous adoption of the
shareholder value maximization dictum. The related focus on quarterly figures is one
of the main drivers of the financial crisis. This should be replaced by a holistic
approach. Companies can compete and succeed with sustainable fundamentals only if
simultaneous value is added to shareholders, customers, employees and the society.
2.2 Second lesson
On an international level, the direction and control of subsidiaries, the so-called
subsidiary governance, has to be critically reconsidered. Many companies that have
been strongly affected by the financial crisis have failed in the field of subsidiary
governance. Complex structured companies in the international arena should not
govern their subsidiaries by ‘‘puppet boards’’ which neither direct nor control
subsidiary management. They should be composed of competent, committed and
independent local board teams. Those subsidiary boards should each be chaired by a
member of the board of directors and not by a member of the management team of
the above operative unit, as it is now being commonly practiced.
3 Keep it strategic
The financial crisis has shown that many boards do not have the know-how required
for an effective direction and control of management in times of crisis. Power
structures on the board level have often been designed in such a way that the
question of Peter Senge arises: ‘‘How can a team of individual IQs above 120 have a
collective IQ of 60?’’, became reality.
3.1 Third lesson
The board of directors should possess in breadth the same market/product and
functional know-how as top management, to be able to direct and control effectively
and efficiently. Complementary team roles such as the roles of a critical thinker, a
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controller or a creative thinker have to be present on the board. Furthermore, each
member should play the role of one stakeholder such as customer, shareholder,
employee and society/environment.
3.2 Fourth lesson
The sustainability of the company’s success cannot be ensured by a one-dimensional
way of focusing on top executive value and quarterly results. Thus, the board has to
develop holistic measures for the company success that differentiates the company
from its competitors on the customer, owner, employee and societal level. The board
should periodically measure and review success in each of the four dimensions.
4 Keep it integrated
The crisis has provided evidence that the globally dominant Anglo-Saxon soft
governance laws has caused negligence for the softer dimensions of companies,
including the successful selection, evaluation, remuneration, development and
succession of members of the board of directors and especially of the managing
board. However, misguided incentives and inadequate succession planning became
realities within the current crisis.
4.1 Fifth lesson
The financial crisis has confirmed that a company needs an integrated board,
management, and personnel compensation concept that is based on internal, external
and company performance equity. In securing the success-based equity, the variable
compensation packages have to account for both the long term and the short term
success horizon of the company (e.g. for boards: 100% of bonuses on a 3 year basis,
for CEO: 50% of bonuses on a 3 year basis or 50% on a 1-year basis). The rating
has to be based on both financial ratios (e.g. EVA) as well as non-financial success
indicators (e.g. customer loyalty). These in turn, have to be compared regularly to
those of relevant competitors.
4.2 Sixth lesson
Succession planning of the board and management represent one of the main
weaknesses and are sources of risk for many companies. Based on a sustainable,
competent succession planning system, the board of directors therefore, should
nominate periodically and confidentially successors for all key positions on the
board and managerial level.
5 Keep it controlled
Last but not least, the global financial crisis has shown that many boards exhibit
weaknesses in terms of controlling, ethical compliance and risk management.
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5.1 Seventh lesson
The effective review of internal and external auditing; the quality of financial
reporting; holistic risk management and internal control; IT governance and
communication as well as legal and ethical compliance are some of the most
important board tasks.
The crisis has illustrated that for publicly traded companies, the greatest area for
improvement is not within legal, but within ethical compliance. This implies that
not everything that is abided by law corresponds to legitimate action. Furthermore,
it has to be understood that codices for proper behavior are worthless if they merely
exist, but are not followed by the top decision makers in the company.
5.2 Eighth lesson
The well-known victims of the financial crisis did not conduct periodic, objective
and comprehensive evaluations with regards to the direction and control of the
company. Therefore, companies should not await new regulations, but proactively
initiate a periodic multi-dimensional evaluation of the board’s performance from the
viewpoint of directors, (core) shareholders and management. That can help not just
to overcome the current crisis, but also to prevent future crises.
6 Conclusion
6.1 Search for sustainability and common sense
In conclusion: ‘‘Common sense is the least common of all senses.’’ The current
global financial crisis has confirmed the Oscar Wilde quotes: Common sense means
that money should serve people, and not the other way around. This attitude should
be kept in mind also when new corporate governance guidelines are developed for
directing and controlling companies. Thus, whether companies rank among losers or
winners of the financial crisis depends to a large extent on their willingness and
ability to consider within a sustainable concept of multiple constituencies rather
than just the interest of top executives and shareholders, but always add
simultaneous value to customers, shareholders, employees, and society.
This special issue includes the following four research papers that have been
selected as the four best presented at the 5th International Research Workshop on
Corporate Governance at the European Institute for Advanced Studies in
Management, in Brussels November 2008:
1. Keep it situational:
‘‘Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility’’
by Sharon Kemp, Swinburne University of Technology (Australia)
‘‘The financial and reputational success of the organization and its members is
out of balance with the human and social costs and benefits. Respondents
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confirmed that board members and senior management should willingly
provide information about the corporation and its activities to its stakeholders,
that information and data should be transparent, the true extent of director
remuneration should be revealed and that financial reporting should be true
and accurate. Board members and senior management can be assisted to
operate in a way that observes socially responsible values and balances the
obligation for profit maximization with corporate social responsibilities
(CSR). This study provides steps that organizations can take to achieve a
balance of intellect, emotionality and sense of purpose and therefore realize
their corporate social responsibility. The results of this empirical and
secondary research suggest a method that may be used to make board
members and senior managers more aware of their corporate social
responsibilities and curtail corporate misbehaviour where the introduction of
a range of new regulations has had little effect.’’
2. Keep it strategic:
‘‘The Credit Crunch, Investor Activists and Corporate Strategy’’
by Coral Ingley, Auckland University of Technology (New Zealand)
Jens Mueller, Waihato Management School (New Zealand)
Graeme Cocks, Melbourne Busines School (Australia)
‘‘The concept of stakeholder engagement is gaining increasing attention in the
mainstream media and may feature as part of a corporation’s strategy for
corporate social responsibility. Not only are boards considering how they
might engage with key stakeholders, but stakeholders are also pursuing greater
participation in the strategic decisions of companies in which they invest.
While this is an emerging concept in companies governed by unitary boards,
as in North America, the issue of stakeholder engagement in various forms is
also entering debate in other countries around the world. In general, however,
the idea of shareholder or stakeholder representation on the boards of most UK
and Commonwealth companies is anathema. Forces now influencing the
development of strategies for stakeholder engagement and the rise of active
investors include changing corporate governance rules which give investors
more power in the election of directors, the increasing role of pension plans
and hedge fund investment groups which have produced investors who keep a
close eye on company performance and value, and a sluggish or turbulent
stock market as a result of the financial crisis initiated by the credit crunch in
the sub-prime mortgage markets. In this paper the phenomenon of stakeholder
representation is examined and results of a recent survey conducted among a
large sample of New Zealand directors are presented. The findings suggest that
these traditionally-oriented boards are increasingly inwardly focused and are
without an agenda for building and managing shareholder and stakeholder
relations. Accordingly, such boards are unlikely to regard stakeholder
engagement as a serious strategic issue and are thus also likely to miss
Redesigning corporate governance 537
123
significant opportunities in the changed business environment to benefit from
stakeholder support.’’
3. Keep it integrated:
‘‘Compensation of Non-Executive Directors’’
by Peter Hahn, and Maziane Lasfer, both Cass Busines School, City
University London (UK)
‘‘Corporate governance guidelines in many countries do not specify the
determinants of non-executive director compensation and the empirical
evidence has only briefly and indirectly addressed this issue. We show that this
question is fundamentally complex because a) whilst the roles of non-
executive directors are relatively well stated, their actual contributions remain
unclear, b) governance codes have not discussed the ways in which non-
executive directors should undertake their roles and c) non-executive director
contribution may be unobservable, and, therefore, their efforts, contribution
and/or performance are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, we find the
literature related to non-executive directors strongly supportive of some sort of
remuneration that is a function of performance and effort to align non-
executive directors with their duties and make boards more efficient in
undertaking their duties.’’
4. Keep it controlled:
‘‘Does Strategic Corporate Performance Depend on Corporate Financial
Architecture?’’
by Irina Ivashkoskaya and Anastasia Stepanova, both Moscow Higher School
of Economics (Russia)
The ‘‘results could have some important policy implications for the firms in
normal economic environment as well as in the period of global economic
crisis. We found that the higher proportion of related ownership which
indicates investors with significant voting power and the board’s composition
affect firm performance positively. The related shareholders and independent
directors seem to add more value to firms while the impact of government
ownership differs depending on the country. The emerging market’s sample
versus the one from developed countries proves the stronger influence of
corporate financial architecture over performance.’’
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